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CAMPBELL AS FAIR USE BLUEPRINT? 
Pierre N. Leval* 
 
Friends, copyright geeks, I come not to bury Campbell,1 but to praise 
it. I might reasonably be considered a biased critic as Campbell took a 
number of suggestions from an article I wrote.2 Biased or not, I submit 
Campbell is a beautifully reasoned opinion, which has demonstrated in 
its twenty-one years that it provides a healthy framework for fair use 
analysis. That framework promotes the overall objectives of copyright; it 
protects the interests of rights holders; and it guards against putting 
“manacles upon science.”3 
This is not to say that every case decided under Campbell has been 
indisputably correct. But disagreement with some decisions of lower 
courts is not a condemnation of Campbell’s blueprint. Furthermore, fair 
use decisions will often involve difficult appraisals, susceptible to 
reasonable disagreement. Nor is it surprising to find inconsistency in 
lower court opinions. Copyright cases come infrequently, especially 
those with fair use questions. Many judges are often confronting the 
complexities of fair use for the first time, and may be quick to reach out 
for what look like easy handholds that are often based on errant dicta. 
I. PRE-CAMPBELL  
To appreciate what Campbell did for us, we should look at the law of 
fair use prior to Campbell. It was a mess, and it gave virtually no 
guidance. For nearly 300 years, courts had acknowledged a need for 
doctrine that would allow copying in some circumstances. There 
developed a widely accepted view that copying in certain types of 
undertakings—criticism, parody, book reviews, news reporting, political 
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This talk was delivered at the 
University of Washington School of Law’s Fair Use in a Digital Age Conference, April 17, 2015. 
1. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
2. See generally id. (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105 (1990)). 
3. Cary v. Kearsley, (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680. 
597 
                                                     
05 - Leval.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:25 PM 
598 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:597 
commentary, historical works, scholarly analyses—would likely be a fair 
use. But, with the exception of Joseph Story’s spare, but well targeted, 
caution in 18414 that a fair use must not “diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work,”5 courts had failed to explain 
how to distinguish between copying that infringes and copying that is 
fair use. Decisions were made from the gut, without any real 
explanation. 
The confusion in the law was due, in no small part, to careless 
utterances by the High Court. The Court needlessly floated a number of 
unhelpful, distracting, counterproductive propositions, which had no 
bearing on the outcome of the particular case and have caused no end of 
confusion and harm. 
First, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,6 in 
gratuitous dictum, the Supreme Court declared that “every commercial 
use of copyrighted material is presumptively” an unfair use.7 This 
statement played no role in the decision. What is more, it was 
incomprehensible. Types of enterprise in which fair use are 
conventionally found—news reporting and analysis, historical and 
biographical studies, reviews of books, theater, and film, as well as 
parody—are conventionally done commercially for profit. The notion 
that commercial uses were presumptively not fair uses plagued fair use 
analysis until at last it was blunted by Campbell. 
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,8 the 
Supreme Court rejected The Nation’s claim that its taking of President 
Ford’s explanation of the Nixon pardon was fair use because it was so 
newsworthy. Public interest in the author’s writing would not justify 
disregard of the author’s copyright. This was altogether valid. 
Otherwise, an author’s success in writing an important book would be 
the author’s undoing. And, as for harm, the Court explained that by 
scooping the “heart of [Ford’s] book,”9 The Nation had usurped the 
“important marketable subsidiary right” of first publication.10 Had the 
Court stopped there, its reasoning would have fit into a useful 
framework for analysis of future fair use disputes. Unfortunately, the 
4. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
5. Id. at 348 (emphasis added). 
6. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
7. Id. at 451. 
8. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
9. Id. at 600 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
10. Id. at 549. 
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opinion aired numerous distracting aphorisms—many of them 
misguided. 
(a) For starters, the Court asserted that quotation from an unpublished 
work tends “to negate the defense of fair use.”11 To the extent that 
proposition could be correct for Harper & Row’s facts, where the 
unauthorized publication scooped the imminent initial publication, the 
proposition would be at least equally incorrect in other circumstances, 
such as where the purpose of the copying is to reveal important facts that 
the rights holder hopes to conceal. If, for example, The Nation had 
discovered secret documents establishing an illicit bargain between 
Nixon and Ford—if, for example, Nixon had demanded a pardon as a 
condition of his resignation in Ford’s favor, and Ford had promised to 
give it—the Court might have said, “[t]he unpublished nature of the 
original strongly supports a finding of fair use.” 
Copyright’s justification lies in its aim to stimulate creativity for the 
enrichment of public knowledge. Exchange of letters establishing 
corrupt bargains is not stimulated by the authors’ hope of publishing 
them for profit. Quoting such letters to reveal what their contents tell 
about their authors serves copyright’s primary goal of enriching public 
knowledge—without derogating from the parallel goal of providing 
authors with financial inducements to create. Fortunately, seven years 
later, Congress passed a special amendment to § 107, rejecting this 
privileging of unpublished works.12 
(b) Second, the Harper & Row Court said there is “a greater need to 
disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.”13 This 
served no role in supporting the Court’s decision. It has been widely 
understood to mean that the defense of fair use is favored when 
quotation is from a factual work. To me that makes no sense. To be sure, 
there is often a need to test the accuracy of propositions advanced in 
factual works, and quotation for such purposes may well be justified as 
fair use. But that is a very different proposition from allowing a second 
writer to copy wholesale from an earlier writer’s treatment of the same 
subject—just because the subject is factual. 
(c) Finally—and most harmful of all—in reference to the fact that The 
11. Id. at 551 (quoting 3 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 13–62, n.2 (1984)). 
12. This was after Harper & Row’s suggestion re-emerged in the Second Circuit’s ruling in 
Salinger that unpublished works “normally enjoy insulation from fair use copying.” Salinger v. 
Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1987), opinion supplemented on denial of reh’g, 818 
F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1987). “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair 
use . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
13. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563. 
 
                                                     
05 - Leval.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:25 PM 
600 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:597 
Nation had gotten access through a “purloined manuscript,”14 the Court 
erroneously characterized fair use as an equitable doctrine15 and 
disastrously declared that “[f]air use presupposes ‘good faith’ and ‘fair 
dealing.’”16 I will return to this issue later on. 
Random distribution of cases from the District Court Clerk’s Office 
sent me an amazing stream of fascinating fair use cases—suits by J. D. 
Salinger17 and the heirs of L. Ron Hubbard18 and Igor Stravinsky19 to 
enjoin biographical writings that quoted from their private documents, 
and the suit brought by publishers of scholarly journals against Texaco 
to enjoin Texaco’s geologists from photocopying scientific articles for 
their files.20 For the decisions of these cases, the precedents offered scant 
guidance, and the guidance they gave was largely bad guidance. My 
decisions scored a sixty-seven percent reversal rate. I thought at the time 
that it had been exciting to find myself at the cutting edge of the law, 
even if in the role of the salami. 
II. CAMPBELL 
The Campbell decision in 1994 brought to an end fair use’s odyssey 
of bad piloting and aimless drift. In place of a laundry list of 
meaningless or harmful aphorisms, the Court undertook at last to explain 
fair use in terms of the goals of copyright—protection of the author’s 
exclusive entitlement to publish for profit, for the enrichment of public 
knowledge. Campbell recognized that, at least in some circumstances, 
those who quote from the writings of prior authors are also authors, and 
that quotation from prior writings for new purposes can also enrich 
public knowledge. To this end, Campbell’s explanation allowed copying 
in order to advance different understandings or achieve new 
14. Id. at 542. 
15. Id. at 551 (mentioning “the equitable nature of the fair use doctrine”); see also WILLIAM F. 
PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (2d ed. 1995) (“It is . . . incorrect to 
characterize fair use as a child of equity. Rather, it was the child of the common law that sought to 
accommodate a statutory scheme . . . .” (emphasis in original)). 
16. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 
130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
17. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) rev’d, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 
1987) opinion supplemented on denial of reh'g, 818 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1987). 
18. New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) aff’d on other 
grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989). 
19. Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
20. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), amended (Oct. 26, 
1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), order amended and superseded, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) 
and aff'd, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 
                                                     
05 - Leval.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:25 PM 
2015] CAMPBELL AS FAIR USE BLUEPRINT? 601 
objectives—so long as the copying is achieved without competing 
significantly with the author’s exclusive entitlements. 
In my view, the most important among Campbell’s contributions are 
the following: 
• It taught us not to search for answers in the words of the 
statute, as Congress made clear in its report that it was not 
undertaking to tell us what fair use is. Its intention was only 
to acknowledge this important doctrine in the statute, 
summarizing what courts had said and leaving further 
development to the courts that created the doctrine.21 
Congress would have been wiser and would have invited less 
occasion for misunderstanding had it written simply that fair 
use is not infringement. That is all it meant. 
• Campbell re-emphasized Story’s focus on whether the 
secondary work diminishes the profits and “‘supersede[s] the 
objects’ of the original.”22 
• It rejected the utility of bright-line rules—especially the 
misconceived bias against commercial uses.23 
• It cast doubt on the continuing validity of Harper & Row’s 
assertion of a good faith requirement.24 
• It cautioned courts not to be too ready (in cases raising a non-
frivolous contention of fair use) to enjoin the work found to 
infringe.25 A work that includes infringing copying may at the 
same time contain much that is non-infringing and valuable—
including some fair use copying, and other copying that does 
not infringe because it communicates facts and ideas, which 
copyright does not protect. Copyright is a commercial 
doctrine—not a “moral right,” as the author’s right is 
conceived in Europe. Copyright’s goal is to guarantee authors 
reasonable compensation. Reasonable compensation for 
infringement can in many cases be a fully adequate copyright 
remedy, while an injunction might deprive the public of a 
work of significant value. 
21. Congress “intended [in § 107] to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to 
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680. 
22. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Justice Joseph Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)). 
23. Id. at 577–78. 
24. Id. at 585 n.18. 
25. Id. at 578 n.10. 
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• Finally, Campbell rejected treating the statute’s four factors 
as disparate inquiries, requiring instead that they be “weighed 
together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”26 
Under Campbell, the four statutory factors are symbiotic. They 
represent interrelated parts of a cohesive inquiry, instructing 
examination from all pertinent sides of the question: How to better 
advance the objectives of copyright? 
What emerges are two essential and intimately intertwined questions: 
1. Does the secondary work copy from the original in pursuit of 
a different objective—a “transformative” purpose? 
2. Does the secondary work compete significantly with the 
original, by offering itself as a significant substitute in 
markets that the copyright law reserves to the original 
author? 
While these may sound like two discrete questions, Campbell took 
pains to point out their interdependence.27 The greater the divergence of 
the objectives of the copying from those of the original, the less likely 
that the secondary work will compete in the original’s exclusive 
markets—the less likely, in Story’s words, that the secondary work will 
“diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”28 
From this perspective, they are not two separate questions at all, but 
rather two facets of one complex question. The transformative purpose 
of the copy remains subservient to the protection of the market value of 
the copyright—the concern of the fourth factor, which Harper & Row 
had identified as “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
use.”29 
Campbell’s touchstone is copyright’s touchstone. The objectives of 
fair use are the objectives of copyright. A copyright law that did not 
allow for fair use, as fair use is conceived in Campbell, would fail to 
satisfy copyright’s objectives. Coming just before the dawn of the 
Internet, Campbell was either prescient, or at least lucky, in formulating 
a mode of analysis that would serve to produce sound answers to 
questions that have arisen in droves in our digital age. 
26. Id. at 578. 
27. Id. at 591 (“[W]hen . . . the second use is transformative, market substitution is at least less 
certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.” ). 
28. Id. at 576 (quoting Justice Story’s decision in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)). 
29. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
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III. HOW IS CAMPBELL DOING? 
Let’s examine some of the criticisms of Campbell. 
A. Complete Unchanged Copies. 
A puzzling view is that a complete, unchanged copy cannot be a fair 
use.30 This seems arbitrary and incompatible with the objectives of 
copyright. It would be disastrously limiting, especially now in the digital 
age when virtually every use of digital material involves making a 
complete copy. 
Even before the digital age, innumerable valuable functions were 
served by making complete unchanged copies, without harm to the value 
of the copyright or diminution of the incentive to create. 
• One entrusted with a unique manuscript to read would want 
to make a copy to ensure against loss, coffee stains, or, if in 
Europe, cigarette burns. 
• Every museum or serious art collection needs a photographic 
copy of each work in its collection, for numerous purposes: to 
provide a meaningful inventory list, to guide future 
restorations in event of damage, and to prove ownership in 
case of theft. 
• An art historian who seeks to assess the influence Matisse and 
Picasso asserted on one another based on comparison of 
paintings which hang in different places throughout the world 
would require photographic copies. 
• Personal letters and memoranda of elected government 
officials and other prominent persons should be subject to 
revelation by journalists and historians to reveal important 
facts about the writers, which they or their descendants might 
wish to conceal. (In such circumstances, reproducing the 
original without change can be important to dispel suspicion 
that the secondary, expository writer may have distorted by 
selective quotation or paraphrase.) 
In the digital age, the need for ability to make complete unchanged 
copies without liability has soared. Numerous well-reasoned court 
decisions have found a fair-use home for complete digital copies that 
transformatively expand knowledge about the works without interfering 
with the legitimate entitlements or incentives of the authors of the works. 
Among these are: 
30. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Commons, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 5–6 (2005). 
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• Arriba Soft31 and Perfect 10,32 where low-resolution 
thumbnails of images were transformatively employed to 
provide an Internet pathway to the originals. Because of the 
low resolution, they did not offer meaningful substitutes to 
potential purchasers of copies of the original images. 
• iParadigms,33 where digital copies of student theses were 
used to detect plagiarism. 
• Swatch,34 where a copy of a private discussion of a publicly 
held corporation’s operating statistics between the 
corporation’s executives and selected financial industry 
analysts was disseminated to a broader public. 
• HathiTrust,35 where large numbers of books were digitized to 
create a tool for identifying and locating books that use 
particular words (as well as telling where in the book the 
words are found), without allowing users to view the text; and 
where the court approved provision of digitized copies in a 
format accessible to the print impaired, in view of the 
“insignifican[ce]” of the market for the product.36 
Campbell’s framework soundly guided those courts to the conclusion 
that the copies were made for a purpose substantially different from that 
of the originals and that, in part because of that difference of purpose, 
and in part because of precautions taken, the copies did not substantially 
compete with, or substitute for, the originals. 
B. Evisceration of the Fourth Factor? 
An objection made particularly with respect to digital copies is that, 
under Campbell, identification of transformative purpose may override 
the fourth factor’s interest in protecting the value of the copyright. 
Professor Ginsburg of Columbia Law School notes that a finding of a 
broadly beneficial transformative purpose may lead the court to give low 
importance, or none at all, to the copyright owner’s fourth factor interest 
in earning revenues from her copyright. Instead of reaping the rewards 
31. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
32. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
33. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
34. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014). 
35. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
36. Id. at 103; cf. S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 64 (1975) (“If the work is ‘out of print’ and unavailable 
for purchase through normal channels, the user may have more justification for reproducing it.”). 
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of their creations, then, authors may be forced to subsidize the world’s 
harvest of their contributions.37 A further criticism is that a finding that 
the secondary work does not compete in the market for the original work 
can blind courts to the need to determine whether the secondary work 
competes with a derivative of the copyrighted work, for which a market 
has not yet developed. 
If lower court opinions are vulnerable to these criticisms, they are not 
criticisms of Campbell, but rather of misinterpretations of Campbell. 
While Campbell unquestionably gives high importance to the 
enrichment of society provided by creatively transformative copying, 
that importance is not at the expense of the fourth factor. To the 
contrary, Campbell characterizes the first factor inquiry as subservient to 
the fourth.38 And if lower court opinions have said that the fourth factor 
favored fair use because the secondary work did not compete with the 
original, without exploring whether it competes with a derivative, this 
may be attributable either to insufficiently cautious diction, or perhaps to 
the absence in the particular case of a plausible argument based on 
derivative rights. Campbell itself explicitly explored whether the 
secondary work infringed the plaintiff’s right in derivative forms; indeed 
the Supreme Court remanded on that question.39 
C. Vagueness and Unpredictability 
Some deplore Campbell’s rejection of bright-line rules, arguing that 
vagueness produces unpredictability, which chills secondary creativity.40 
37. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Letter from the US: Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, and Uncertain 
Compliance with International Norms – Part II (Fair Use), REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT 
D’AUTEUR (forthcoming Jan. 2015) (manuscript at 4–19) (Columbia Law and Economics, Working 
Paper No. 503), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539178 (noting that authors are rarely, if 
ever, in this position). 
38. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (demonstrating that 
transformative works tend to be fair uses because they are less likely to “act[] as a substitute” for the 
original work and thus to “affect the market for the original in a way cognizable under [the fourth] 
factor”). 
39. Id. at 594. 
40. See, e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 159 (2012) (arguing that the “vagueness and 
uncertainty” of the post-Campbell fair use standard “have an enormous chilling effect on the vast 
universe of speech that incorporates and builds on copyrighted material”); Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1620 (2009) (“The 
uncertainty of the standard, if anything, is likely to deter potential users . . . from treading too close 
to the boundaries of impermissible copying.”); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 139, 178 (2009) (calling for “crystallizing fair use by incorporating determinate 
benchmarks for legitimate takings [through] a straightforward formula: take standards, and replace 
them with rules”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 
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Without doubt, a clear rule is a good thing, at least if it produces good 
results. But bright-line tests applied to complex circumstances are likely 
to produce unjustifiable results, which will be even more injurious to 
creativity than uncertainty. 
When copyright disputes reach bad results, the ultimate loser is the 
public, which is the primary intended beneficiary of the copyright law. 
This injury to the public occurs regardless of whether fair use is too 
liberally dispensed, harming the ability of original authors to earn from 
their creations and thus chilling creation, or too narrowly applied, 
foreclosing the dissemination of secondary works that advance 
copyright’s goals without significant harm to the original authors. In 
either case, the public loses. 
A bright-line rule that would either place unreasonable restraints on 
the creativity of secondary users, or unreasonably diminish the 
protection of original authors, would not be an improvement. Deploring 
a test’s vagueness is easy. Much more difficult is to come up with a clear 
test that would provide better, or at least acceptable, results. So far as I 
am aware, none have been suggested. 
Furthermore, I do not agree with the proposition that fair use 
adjudications under Campbell have been wildly unpredictable. While 
some cases involve very difficult exercises of line drawing, on the 
whole, I believe the great majority of circuit-level opinions since 
Campbell have been well justified and reasonably predictable.41 
D. Complementary 
An interesting quibble with Campbell comes from the endlessly 
resourceful and fascinating mind of Judge Posner. He argues that, 
instead of the concept of “transformativeness,” the goal of the first factor 
would be better explained by asking whether the original and the 
secondary works are in a “complementary relationship”—as with a 
hammer and nail—so that in conjunction the two achieve something 
neither can achieve on its own—to the mutual benefit of both. 42 
1483, 1489, 1511–18 (2007) (arguing that fair use is unpredictable and suggesting nonexclusive, 
bright-line rules defining per se fair uses). 
41. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2537 (2009) (“If 
one analyzes putative fair uses in light of cases previously decided in the same policy cluster, it is 
generally possible to predict whether a use is likely to be fair or unfair.”).
 42.  Ty, Inc. v Publ’ns Int’l, Inc., 292 F.3d 512, 517–18 (7th Cir. 2002); see also WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
153–54 (2003). 
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Judge Posner illustrates this by reference to book reviews.43 
Publishers depend on book reviews to publicize their books. Book 
reviews are more useful to book readers if they quote from the books 
they review. If reviewers’ right to quote depended on permission from 
the publisher, the public would justifiably distrust the independence of 
the reviews. Therefore, both sides benefit from the right of reviewers to 
quote without permission, and the consent of publishers to such 
quotation can be inferred from the overall benefit they derive, regardless 
of the fact that the quotation will be sometimes in the service of a 
negative review.44 
I believe this argument fails. It works with the example of fair use that 
Judge Posner has chosen. But, for other heartland examples of fair use, it 
doesn’t. Consider where the secondary author—an investigative 
reporter—quotes unknown private writings of a public figure to reveal 
the plaintiff’s bigotry, lies, cruelty, crimes, or corruption, through the 
plaintiff’s own words. Effective exposition by the secondary writer 
requires copying the original words. The expository writer cannot say 
merely, “That man was a liar and a thief. Take my word for it.” 
Even if Posner is correct that the consent of book publishers can be 
inferred from benefits that unauthorized quotation confers on them, if 
the Presidents, Prime Ministers, Senators, and Judges of the nations of 
the world could elect either to authorize or to prohibit free quotation 
from their previously unpublished writings, what percentage would say 
yes to free quotation? My guess is zero. Parody is another classic 
example of fair use. The essence of parody is ridicule, and few authors 
would consent to have their work ridiculed. The “complementary” 
formula, requiring the flow of benefits to the owner of rights in the 
quoted material to justify fair use, would kill off many forms of 
secondary use that further copyright’s objectives. 
A further problem with using the term “complementary” as the key to 
fair use is that the word perfectly describes the classic examples of 
derivative works, which by definition cannot be fair uses, as they are 
protected by the author’s copyright in the original work. Conversion of a 
novel into a film, or of a cartoon character into a plush toy, translation of 
a poem—these are perfect examples of complementaries, but they do not 
qualify for fair use. 
43.  Ty, 292 F.3d at 517–18; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 42, at 153–54. 
44.  Ty, 292 F.3d at 517–18; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 42, at 153–54. 
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E. Valid Criticisms 
1. Ambiguity of “Transformative”  
I recognize that the word “transformative” suffers from the same 
ambiguity as “complementary.” This raises a problem. The problem 
arises from the need for standards to distinguish derivatives (which are 
governed by the original author’s copyright) from fair uses (which are 
not). Although not always recognized as such, this question is often the 
crux of a fair use dispute. A confusing application of the fourth factor 
arises when the original author has suffered no loss of sales of the 
original work, but has a credible claim of infringement for the making of 
a derivative. To say that the secondary use was transformative is not a 
sufficient answer because the word “transformative,” like 
“complementary,” can apply to derivatives as well as to fair uses. 
Indeed, the statutory definition of a “derivative” employs the word 
“transform.”45 Accordingly, saying that a secondary work transforms the 
original does nothing to distinguish a fair use from a derivative. 
But it does not follow from this ambiguity that the word 
“transformative” is an inappropriate symbol to signify the crux of the 
first factor inquiry. I don’t think I have heard a better one. Because some 
manner of change is at the heart of both derivatives and fair uses, any 
word that focuses descriptively on that crucial fair use element will 
suffer from the same ambiguity. Indeed, the word “derivative” also 
suffers from it. Any copying, even if it achieves fair use status, 
necessarily derives from the original. 
Transformative, however, was never intended as a full definition or 
explanation of fair use. If a transformative purpose is required for fair 
use, that does not mean that any sort of transformation qualifies. 
Campbell (and my article as well) would certainly have done well to 
explain the tautological, but not necessarily obvious, point that the 
transformative purpose required to achieve fair use cannot be the same 
type of transformation that results in a derivative. 
If that were the end of the problem, it would be easy enough to fix. 
All that would be required would be an authoritative opinion explaining 
that, while a transformative use is usually necessary to satisfy the first 
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other 
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial 
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original 
work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”).
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factor, it is not sufficient. Transformations of the sort that produce a 
substitute for a derivative work don’t qualify. But that is not the end of 
the matter. The more serious and much more difficult problem is how to 
distinguish between transformative uses that can result in fair uses and 
those that result in derivatives. 
2. How to Tell a Derivative  
How should we distinguish between fair uses and derivatives? 
(a) Music Sampling. Think of various manifestations of musical 
quotation or sampling: 
• A piece of new music that includes a few bars from a well-
known work, a kind of nod of acknowledgment to the 
influence of the former—fair use or a derivative? 
• A new piece of music consists largely of a stringing together 
of such quotations from numerous former influential works? 
• A new work that contains passages copied from a little known 
work? 
(b) Quiz Books. Consider quiz books. Suppose one without 
authorization markets a trivia quiz book, based on Downton 
Abbey or The Sopranos. 
• “What was Lady Mary wearing when she first met Matthew 
Crawley?” 
• “What was the name of the boat on which Tony and his 
friends bade farewell to Big Pussy?” 
(c) Sequels. What about sequels? 
• Suppose that among the 100,000 members of a Harry Potter 
Internet Fan Club, members freely compose and share 
sequels.46 
• Or, consider a sequel like The Wind Done Gone, in which the 
new work retells the original’s story from a different 
character’s point of view, which inherently attacks the 
original’s assumptions.47 
Should the answers for the two types of sequel be the same, or 
different? 
Transformations of the sort producing fair use are usually of a 
different character from the transformations that produce derivatives. In 
the fair use context, the word most frequently refers to the purpose of the 
46. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common 
Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 (1997). 
47. See Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F. 3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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copying—ordinarily to communicate some kind of commentary about 
the original or provide information about it. As Campbell explained in 
its distinction between parody—an exemplary instance of fair use—and 
satire, 
[t]he heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing 
material is the use of some elements of a prior author’s 
composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments 
on that author’s works. If, on the contrary, the commentary has 
no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original 
composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get 
attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something 
fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work 
diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish). . . . Parody needs 
to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to 
use the creation of its victim’s . . . imagination, whereas satire 
can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the 
very act of borrowing.48 
In the derivative context, by contrast, what Campbell refers to as the 
“critical bearing”49 of the secondary work will generally be absent. The 
transformation involved in making a derivative is usually one of form or 
medium, offering the same work in a new version, form, medium, or 
shape, rather than offering information or commentary about the 
original. 
The classic understanding of derivatives is that they are works that re-
present the original author’s creative expression in a different medium or 
form to an audience that either is, or would be, motivated by 
appreciation of the original author’s creative expression—a novel 
converted into a film, a poem translated into another language, an oil 
painting photographically reproduced on paper. Consistent with this 
notion, the statute defines derivatives by a “such-as” list which includes 
“translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, . . . art reproduction,” etc.50 
In this formulation, Congress was not defining derivative doctrine. It 
was legislating in an older mode, in which Congress viewed the courts 
as partners. Congress sought to express its policy through a list of 
examples that would convey the rough idea of the types of 
transformations Congress had in mind as protected derivatives—leaving 
it to the courts to interpret Congress’s intention and formulate a standard 
48. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994) (internal citations omitted). 
49. Id. at 580. 
50. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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that would accomplish Congress’s goal. 
3. What Should the Standard Be?  
Campbell noted that “the market for potential derivative uses includes 
only those that creators of original works would in general 
develop . . . .”51 This appropriately limited the scope of derivatives. 
Authors cannot enlarge the scope of their copyright (to the detriment of 
society) to control criticism, analyses, mockery, or parody simply by 
offering to license such uses. Nor would it necessarily matter that users 
agreed to pay for such licenses. If the price is not prohibitive, would-be 
users will often pay for authorization to use without challenge, 
notwithstanding that they might have the right to do so without 
authorization—just to avoid the uncertainties and expenses of litigation. 
Campbell did not undertake the further step of analyzing the scope of the 
territory covered by the derivative right. It did, however, offer the 
illuminating passage quoted just above on the distinction between 
parody and satire, explaining that a parody is more likely to be fair use 
because it draws its justification for the taking from the fact that its 
purpose is to comment on the original. This distinction between parody 
and satire sheds light on the more general distinction between fair uses 
and derivative works. 
Whether a type of copying infringes the author’s rights over 
derivatives, or is a fair use, is a matter of copyright policy. Copyright 
law’s ability to achieve its objectives depends in part on how courts 
answer the question. Just as courts have made crucial normative 
judgments, drawing the boundary lines of copyright to include manner 
of expression, but not ideas and facts, courts must make a normative 
judgment to draw the boundary line that separates derivatives from fair 
uses, and must do so in relation to the nature and purpose of copyright. 
Focus on the nature and purpose of the copyright can provide a 
helpful approach to making this distinction. What the copyright protects 
is the author’s manner of expression. The examples of derivatives set 
forth in the statutory list are of secondary works that seek to re-
communicate the protected expression of the original, converted into a 
different form or medium. This suggests at least the germ of a useful 
test. 
The more the aim of the secondary copying is to communicate the 
original author’s manner of expression (albeit in a changed form)—
without commentary on it or provision of information about it—the 
51. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. 
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stronger the argument that the secondary transformation should be 
classed as a derivative, and be subject to the original author’s copyright. 
In contrast, the more the copying is done for the purpose of 
communicating attitudes or information about the original, the stronger 
the argument supporting fair use. 
This germ of a test would not serve to answer all such questions. As 
with other aspects of fair use analysis, it should not be a rigid rule. 
Furthermore, courts have concluded that some secondary uses that 
merely seek to communicate the original author’s manner of expression 
in a changed form or medium (without transformative purpose) qualify 
as fair use, when the costs of producing such transformations are so 
high, and the market for them so small, that the rights holder would not 
incur the costs of producing them herself. An example is the recent 
HathiTrust case, in which the court found fair use for conversion of 
books into a format accessible to certified print-impaired users, noting 
that the market for such a format was insignificant.52 
IV. BAD FAITH 
A final word on Campbell’s contributions. Few pronouncements have 
been more harmful to fair use than the Supreme Court’s assertion in 
Harper & Row that “[f]air use presupposes good faith and fair 
dealing.”53 Why is this so harmful? First, a good-faith requirement 
would undermine the primary goal of copyright—to enrich public 
knowledge. Equally important, such a requirement would have very bad 
practical consequences for all participants. 
The copyright is a commercial property right given by law to authors 
to stimulate creativity so as to benefit society at large. Three limitations 
on the scope of the copyright undertake to assure that copyright will 
advance, rather than suppress, that goal. The goal would be seriously 
harmed if original authorship encompassed the right to suppress the 
publication by others of facts or ideas contained in the original and fair 
uses made of it. The fact that a secondary user, who copies to 
disseminate facts or discuss ideas contained in the original, or to make 
transformative fair uses, may have acted in bad faith has no bearing on 
the copyright law’s goal of allowing such uses for the enrichment of 
public knowledge, without harm to the original author’s financial 
52. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 103 (2d Cir. 2014); cf. S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 
64 (1975) (“If the work is ‘out of print’ and unavailable for purchase through normal channels, the 
user may have more justification for reproducing it.”). 
53. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
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incentives to create. The public’s access to important knowledge should 
not be barred because of bad behavior by the purveyor of the knowledge. 
A copier’s bad faith has no logical bearing on the scope of the original 
author’s copyright. 
Investigative writers often need to dissemble to obtain access to raw 
materials for valuable expository works. Those who write to expose the 
corruption of public figures may need to falsely portray themselves as 
ardent admirers to gain access to private files. It makes no sense for 
copyright law to deprive the public of the knowledge the secondary 
author provides, and impose liability on the publisher of the secondary 
work, because the secondary writer engaged in deceptive sweet-talk. The 
law has other remedies, both civil and criminal, for deceitful conduct. It 
is not the concern of the copyright law. Making it copyright’s concern 
would impair copyright’s objective of enriching public knowledge. 
Of more immediate practical import, a good-faith requirement would 
impose huge inefficiencies, costs, and uncertainties on everyone 
concerned. The law should permit the prospective publisher of an 
expository work that quotes from the letters and memoranda of a public 
figure to make a reasonably confident evaluation of whether the 
publication would be an infringement or fair use by studying and 
comparing the two texts. The publisher should not be compelled to 
launch a costly, difficult investigation into the secondary author’s 
dealings with her sources before deciding whether to publish her work. 
A good-faith requirement would add enormous costs, burdens, and 
chilling risks to the publishing process, thus harming the copyright law’s 
objectives. 
Such a requirement would also sabotage an efficient judicial process. 
Fair use disputes should generally be amenable to disposition on the 
pleadings or on summary judgment. The answer should ordinarily be 
evident from study and comparison of the texts. But, if judgment will 
depend on what the secondary writer said to get access to the files and a 
moralistic evaluation of whether she acted in good faith, courts will 
frequently be unable to decide in the pretrial stages of the litigation. 
Trials, perhaps with juries, will be required, which will impose not only 
huge expenses on all participants, but also catastrophic delays of 
publication, as well as potentially quirky results influenced by a jury’s 
sympathies. 
It is hard to knock good faith, and easy to villainize bad faith, but 
allowing allegations of bad faith to play a role in fair use adjudications 
would hurt everyone. It would be a lose-lose proposition. 
Accordingly, among the many great benefits bestowed by Campbell 
was its tactful, but firm, step in the direction of correcting Harper & 
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Row’s misstep. Campbell undertakes comprehensive instruction on how 
fair use analysis should be made, nowhere assigning any pertinence to 
whether there was bad faith in the development of the claimed fair use. 
That by itself strongly suggests the Court was saying the question is not 
a part of fair use analysis. Nor does Campbell repeat Harper & Row’s 
canard that fair use is an “equitable doctrine.” Then, in footnote 18, after 
noting conflicting precedent on the pertinence of good faith, the Court 
added, “Even if good faith were central to fair use, [the defendant’s] 
actions were not inconsistent with good faith.”54 The formulation, “Even 
if it were,” strongly implies, “It isn’t.”55 This was a diplomatic way of 
putting in doubt the survival of the earlier assertion without forcing 
those who had joined in the opinion to acknowledge error (something 
judges hate doing). 
It is hard to think of a more useful role copyright scholarship could 
play today than by convincing the Supreme Court to finish the job begun 
by Campbell and expressly disavow that fair use presupposes good faith. 
V. COPYRIGHT’S FIRST AMENDMENT  
A concluding thought. Copyright and freedom of the press are 
uncomfortable bedfellows. It is not easy to see how copyright could 
survive under our Constitution if it did not have its own express 
constitutional authorization. 
Even with that authorization, the copyright, if too broadly construed, 
would clash intolerably with a free press. Although the “Progress of 
Science” (or knowledge) explains the justification for “securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings,”56 overly broad authorial control would undermine 
the progress of knowledge and clash with press freedom. 
Wise judicial tailoring of the scope of copyright has minimized that 
conflict. Together with the doctrines that remove the use of facts and 
ideas from the control of copyright, fair use serves as the First 
Amendment’s agent within the framework of copyright. Campbell crafts 
a fine balance, converting a head-on conflict into a healthy synergy. 
 
54. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585. 
55. H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 595 (2d ed. 1965) (discussing 
the counterfactual implication of the subjunctive); THEODORE M. BERNSTEIN, THE CAREFUL 
WRITER: A MODERN GUIDE TO ENGLISH USAGE 430 (1965) (same). 
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 
                                                     
